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NOTES AND COMMENTS
involuntary manslaughter in Kentucky. A death which is the resulit of ordinary
negligence is held to constitute the offense.' Such decisions in effect establish
the tort standard of care for involuntary manslaughter. Here, again, Kentucky
is in opposition to the overwhelming weight of authority. It is a general pnn-
ciple of criminal law that something more than a lack of ordinary care is requisite
to criminal liability.2 t However, the application of any other higher standard of
care to involuntary manslaughter is precluded in Kentucky by the definition of
voluntary manslaughter as a homicide resulting from gross negligence. Since in-
voluntary manslaughter is the lesser offense, the standard of care employed must
necessarily be lower because the culpable negligence involved in each instance is
the basis of liability. Therefore, the only workable standard of care beneath the
standard required by Kentucky in its fictitious voluntary negligent manslaughter
is ordinary care or the tort standard. Nevertheless, the classification of any negli-
gent manslaughter as a voluntary one is fundamentally erroneous, and this error
should not be used to force the law of the sister offense of involuntary man-
slaughter into the realm of criminal liability for the lack of mere ordinary care.
Although it may be asserted that the classification of certain negligent man-
slaughters as voluntary manslaughter is justified in Kentucky by the fact that the
existing punishment for involuntary manslaughter is not severe enough due to
the rule that it is only a common law misdemeanor in Kentucky, such a procedure
is erroneous both logically and legally and is a breeder of confusion. Moreover,
anomalies of this character are utterly unnecessary although the exigencies of some
situations seem to demand them. The obvious answer to Kentucky s primary
need in the law of manslaughter is statutory reform-at least a statute placing
negligent manslaughter under involuntary manslaughter where it ought to be, and
pumshing the crime in a degree appropriate to the felony that it is, and defining
the standard of care as one appropriate to criminal liability.
JAMES DANIEL CORNETTE
THE RETREAT TO THE WALL DOCTRINE OF SELF-DEFENSE
In order to be excused on the grounds of self-defense in the early law of
homicide, it was necessary to gain the king s pardon.' Gradually, however, self-
defense became a legally recognized excuse for homicide, although some of its
most fundamental principles did not fully crystallize until modern times.
At the very beginning the so-called "retreat to the wall" doctrine became a
Embry v. Commonwealth, 286 Ky. 204, 32 S.W 2d 979 (1981).
"State v. Elliott, I Terry 250, 8 A. 2d 873 (Del. 1939); Pitts v. State, 132
Fla. 812, 182 So. 234 (1938); Croker v. State, 57 Ga. App. 895, 197 S.E. 92
(1938); People v. Hansen, 378 Ill. 491, 38 N.E. 2d 738 (1941); State v. Ela, 136
Me. 303, 8 A 2d 589 (1939); Scott v. State, 183 Miss. 788, 185 So. 195 (1939);
State v. Carter, 342 Mo. 439, 116 S.W 2d 21 (1938); Commonwealth v. Aunck,
342 Pa. 282,19 A. 2d 920 (1941); State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 91 P 2d 457
(1939); Bell v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 597, 195 S. E. 675 (1938); State v. Law-
son, 128 W Va. 136, 36 S.E. 2d 26 (1946); MAY, CRIMINAL LAW sec. 174.
' POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 478 (2d ed., 1911).
"The defendant deserved but needed the king s pardon."
1 Beale, Retreat From a Murderous Assault, 16 HArv. L. REv. 567 (1903).
is a doctrine of modem, rather than of medieval law."
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necessary part of the law of self-defense.' If one murderously assailed could es-
cape the attack by retreating, he had to do so rather than kill.' Thus, four hun-
dred years after the recognition of this requirement an Iowa judge instructed a
jury as follows:
" it is a general rule of law that, where one person
is assaulted by another, it is the duty of the person thus assaulted to
retire to what is termed in the law a wall or ditch before he is justi-
fied in repelling such assault in taking the life of his assailant. But
cases frequently arise where the assault is made with a dangerous or
deadly weapon, and in so fierce a manner as not to allow the party
thus assaulted to retire without manifest danger to his life or of great
bodily injury, in such cases he is not required to retreat."'
This was the view as it developed in England and as it was brought to this
country by the English colonists.' Hale, in attempting to rationalize the doc-
trine, wrote:
"For though in cases of hostility between two nations it
is a reproach and piece of cowardize to fly from an enemy, yet in
cases of assaults and affrays between subjects under the same law,
the law owns not any such point of honour, because the king and his
laws are to bo the vnidices injunarum, and private persons are not
trusted to take capital revenge one of another.""
This basic rule requiring retreat to prevent the taking of life has always been
subject, however, to certain exceptions. Thus in People v. Tomlins,' the de-
fendant, attacked in his home by his son, inflicted a mortal wound. In reversing
a conviction of murder in the first degree, Justice Cardozo said, "It is not now
and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling is bound to
retreat. He is under no duty to take to the fields and highways, a fugitive
from his own home." This exception has been extended in many cases from the
home or "castle" to the curtilage,' to the place of work,"' to a hotel office," to
the defendant's property,'12 and even to any place he had a "right to be." As will
be discussed later, the expansion of this exception has led to virtually complete
abrogation of the retreat rule in most jurisdictions.
'Id. at 575. See also State v. Jones, 89 Iowa 182, 56 N.W 427 (1893);
State v. Warner, 100 Iowa 260, 69 N.W 546 (1896).
'I HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 481 (1778); Beale, supra note 2 at 574.
"' State v. Donnelley, 69 Iowa 705, 27 N.W 369, 370 (1886). In Common-
wealth v. Drumm, 58 Penn. 9 (1868), it was stated that as between safe retreat
and the death of even an assailant who intends to kill, the former is preferable.
'Beale, supra note 2 at 568.
HALE, supra note 4.
'213 N. Y. 240, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (1914).
'State v. Rutledge, 135 Iowa 581, 113 N.W 461 (1907); State v. Bennett,
128 Iowa 713, 105 N.W 324 (1905); see People v. Lilly, 38 Mich. 270 (1878).
"Brown v. United States, 256 U. S. 335 (1921). "While ones house for-
merly meant his home, his dwelling, the rule has also been extended to ones place
of business or his place of refuge; consequently a man s place of business must
be regarded pro hac vice his dwelling. He has the same right to defend it against
intrusion, and is under no more necessity of retreating from the one than from
the other; his duty to defend one is the same as to defend the other." Hill v.
State, 194 Ala. 11, 25, 69 So. 941, 946 (1915).
" Rowe v. United States, 164 U. S. 546 (1896).
12 Beard v. United States, 158 U. S. 550 (1895).
" Gibson v. Commonwealth, 237 Ky 33, 34 S.W 2d 936 '(1931).
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A second possible exception existed in the doubt as to whether the right to
kill in self-defense could be invoked by those who were at fault in provoking the
difficulty." In this country, however, an aggressor in sudden affray may invoke
the right to kill in self-defense if he first retreats and thus makes unmistakably
clear his intention of quitting the combat.'
In addition, it is important to draw the distinction between a simple assault
and a murderous assault. In the first instance the person attacked is able to stand
his ground and meet the attack with a reasonable force."8 But in the case of the
murderous assault, the amount of force required to repel the attack may cause
death or great bodily harm, and it is in this situation that the "retreat to the wall"
rule becomes applicable."
The retreat rule has had rough sailing in the United States, particularly in the
South where a strong code of personal honor prohibited an ignommous retreat
and the West where such honor was combined with the rough necessities and
imminent dangers of frontier life. In a land where six-shooters ruled, there was
no room for a rule of retreat. "The king and his laws" offered little protection
from a bullet in the back.
An excellent rationalization of this departure from the retreat rule in the
South and West appears per Sherwood, J., in State v. Bartlett:
"It is true, human life is sacred, but so is human liberty.
One is as dear in the eye of the law as the other, and neither is to
give way and surrender its legal status in order that the other may
exclusively exist, supposing for a moment such an anomoly be pos-
sible. In other words, the wrongful and violent ace of one man shall
not abolish or even temporarily suspend the lawful and constitutional
right of his neighbor
"But nothing above asserted is intended to convey the
idea that one man, because he is the physical inferior of another,
from whatever cause such inferiority may arise, is, because of such
inferiority, bound to submit to a public horsewhipping. We hold it
a necessary self-defense to resist, resent, and prevent such humiliat-
ing indignity-such a violation of the sacredness of one s person-
and that, if nature has not provided the means for such resistence,
art may; in short, a weapon may be used to effect the unavoidable
necessity.""a
The law of Texas very strongly adopts these views and completely abrogates
the retreat rule." In fact most American jurisdictions have, virtually abolished
the rule.- They have not, however, done so by subscribing to the views of the
"1 HAwKINS, PLEAS OF THE CRoWN 82, 87 (8th ed. 1824); I EAST, PLEAS OF
THE CRoWN 277, 278 (5th ed. 1803. According to HALE, supra note 4, the
aggressor was excused for slaying in self-defense, if he retreated in an honest en-
deavor to save his life.
"See People v. Garretson, 2 Wheeler s Crim. Cases 347, 351 (N. Y. 1823).
'O Id. at 354.
IT Id. at 354.
1170 Mo. 658, 71 S.W 148, 151, 152 (1902).
"D Brown v. United States, 256 U. S. 335 (1921). Justice Holmes cites Texas
and other jurisdictions as subscribing to the proposition that "if a man reasonably
believes he is in immediate danger of death or grievous bodily harm from his
assailant he may stand his ground and that if he kills him he has not exceeded the
bounds of lawful self-defense."
'Note, 41 COL. L. REv. 733 (1941).
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South and West, but rather have extended the "defense of castle" doctrine, alluded
to earlier, to include any place where the defendant had a "right to be." Even in
State v. Bartlett,2' above, the court emphasized that the defendant had a right
to be where he was. It is evident, therefore, that the common law rule has been
largely repudiated even though lip-service frequently is rendered to an abstract
"duty to retreat,"'
Today the majority of American courts hold that whether or not the assault
be felomous,' any person not a trespasser2 ' may stand his ground against an
assailant," except where the slayer sought or commenced the affray." A smaller
number of courts have imposed the duty of retreat from personal assault in all
circumstances' where it appears consistent with the actor s safety. A third group
of decisionse' are traceable to Sir Michael Foster," who, supported by other
writers," argued that slaying a would-be murderer in self-defense is a 1ustifiab.e
rather than excusable homicide.' Justifiable homicide, was a killing by operation
of law, ' unlike excusable homicide, imposed no duty of retreat." Courts following
this rule impose no duty to retreat where the deceased manifestly attempted to
commit a felony involving force.' They do, however, impose a duty to retreat
where the slaying occurs as the result of a mutual encounter or sudden affray.'
Is it possible to reconcile these conflicting views and resolve them into a
workable and universal retreat rule for self-defense? Should we be swayed by
the powerful argument of Professor Beale' that "it may be distasteful to retreat
"Supra note 18 at 71 S.W at 151. "He had a right to be where he was,
and the wrong of Edwards in assaulting and beating him there could not deprive
him of that right And this idea of the non-necessity of retreating from any
locality where one has a right to be is growing in favor, as all doctrines based upon
sound reason inevitably will. "
-Enyart v. People, 67 Colo. 434, 180 Pac. 722 (1919); People v. Durand,
307 Ill. 611, 139 N.E. 78 (1923); State v. Grimmett, 33 Nev. 531, 112 Pac. 273
(1910); State v. Rader, 94 Ore. 432, 186 Pac. 79 (1919); Earles v. State, 94 S.W
464 (Tex. 1906); State v. Donahue, 79 W Va. 260, 90 S.E. 834 (1916). See
JEROMz HALL, CASES AND READINGS ON CaRmsNAL LAW 255 (1949).
"State v. Rader, 94 Ore. 432, 186 Pac. 79 (1919).
2' A trespasser cannot kill in self defense when retreat is possible. Macins v.
State, 36 Ariz. 140, 283 Pac. 711, 717 (1929).
'-Enyart v. People, 67 Colo. 434, 180 Pac. 722 (1919).
' State v. Hatch, 57 Kan. 420, 424, 46 Pac. 708, 709 (1896).
- This view does not extend to one s home. People v. Tomlins, 213 N. Y.
240, 107 N.E. 496 (1914).
"Bieard v. State, 189 Ark. 217, 72 S.W 2d. 530 (1934).
'See Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (1876); State v. Phillips, 59 Wash.
252, 109 Pa6. 1047 (1910); Note, 41 COL. L. REV. 733 (1941).
' FOSTER, CROWN LAW 273 (1762).
I BISHOP, CmainNAL LAW 605 (9th ed. 1923); 1 EAST, PLEAS OF THE
CRowN 271 (1806); 3 RUSSELL, CRIMES 213 (6th ed. 1896).
"Beale, supra note 2 at 573. Professor Beale feels that Foster s view is er-
roneous and stems from a faulty understanding of a passage from Coke.
' Beale, supra note 2 at 572. "Killing in due execution of law was
justifiable. This meant at first killing under warrant or by custom; later private
persons were permitted to execute the law upon felons in a few cases. These
cases were almost without exception attacks by robbers.
"FOSTER, supra note 32.
"State v. Glenn, 198 N. C. 79, 150 S.E. 663 (1929); Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio
St. 186 (1876); State v. Phillips, 59 Wash. 252, 109 Pac. 1047 (1910).
" Jones v. State, 22 Ala. App. 472, 116 So. 896 (1928); see State v. Lucas,
164 N. C. 471, 474, 79 S.E. 674, 675 (1913).
"Beale, supra note 2 at 581.
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but it is ten times as distasteful to kill?" On the other hand, should we support
the position of Judge Sherwood in Bartlett v. State and hold that human honor,
dignity, and right are in equal value to human life?
It appears that the very existence of such divergent views impels us inevitably
to the conclusion that the retreat rule should not stand as the final test of self-
defense, but rather should be but one factor in determining the guilt or innocence
of the defendant.
As Justice Holmes wrote in Brown v. U S., "Rationally the failure to retreat
is a circumstance to be considered with all the others in order to determine wheth-
er the defendant went farther than he was justified in doing; not a categorical
proof of guilt."' An avenue of possible retreat should be a circumstance in the
case along with size and the location of parties, provocation, suddenness of com-
bat, and other factors a jury must weigh in determining whether the defendant
is to be excused for his homicide in self-defense.
ROBERT HALL SMITH
SOLICITATION AS A BASIS OF JURISDICTION OVER A
FOREIGN CORPORATION
The amenability of foreign corporations to suit in state courts has long been
a troublesome problem, both in state courts and, since the problem is essentially
one of due process, in federal courts. It has been said that in matters of junsdic
tion the courts tend to treat natural persons and corporations similarly, but this is
overstatement. On the other hand, the dictum of Mr. Chief Justice Taney in
Bank of Augusta v. Earle that "a corporation can have no legal existence out of
the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created,"' does not present a
realistic view of the situation. And yet, Taney s statement represented the pre-
vailing view at one time. Such a doctrine could not stand in an era in which
the corporation was fast becoming the most popular method of carrying on
business.
To meet the demands of practical necessity in subjecting foreign corporations
to proceedings in courts outside their state of domicil, various theories have been
advanced. As in the case of an individual, jurisdiction in personam may be ac
quired over a foreign corporation by consent. An agent may be appointed by
the corporation to accept service of process. The appointment of an agent or of
a state official to accept service of process is treated as consent to the exercise of
jurisdiction. Where such an appointment has been made by the corporation, it
is clear that there is actual consent to service of process and the state s courts
have junsdiction to render a valid judgment.' Where such an appointment is not
made consent is sometimes implied. The theory of "implied consent" supposes
that since a corporation may not enter a state without permission, its voluntary
entry into the state renders valid the assumption that it has impliedly assented to
- 256 U. S. 335, 343 (1921). Holmes went on to say, "Detached reflection
cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife."
'Barrow Steamship Company v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100 (1898).
13 Pet. 519 (U. S. 1839).
'Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Company v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling
Company 243 U. S. 93 (1917).
'Ibid.
